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I would like to suggest a means of contributing to the improvement of human rights observances by practical international action. Accomplishing this
goal would require moving the world out of the rut of its traditional approach
to the centrally important aspects of international relations. Human rights observances are part of this important complex of factors. To bring about such
a change requires the thinking of some novel thoughts as well as persistence
and dedicated effort. Progress would entail difficulties and perhaps some risk
and sacrifice. If, however, the course of action I outline is practical, it follows
that the risks and sacrifices will not be so great as to be unacceptable.
This proposal is concerned with the United Nations. It entails one of the
novel thoughts-the necessity of rethinking the role and potential of the
United Nations. It is desirable first to outline the nature of the human rights
problem, which is the focus of our immediate attention.
International efforts to solve the human rights problem bear some
resemblance to international efforts to solve the arms problem. I have been
watching the latter efforts most of my life; I retain a strong recollection of the
1922 five-power naval treaty, which was supposed to be a breakthrough and a
vindication of the role of World War I as the war to end all wars. Since then,
disarmament conferences have continued. The 1922 treaty was the last event
that impressed me as a breakthrough. Since then, we have participated in
and observed a variety of arms races, including the nuclear arms race still in
progress.
International efforts to improve the observance of human rights started
just after World War II and have grown in scope and in the apparent
strength of measures taken. The result bears a resemblance, perhaps a family
resemblance, to the result of arms control efforts. The twenty-fifth report of
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, entitled New Aspects of the
InternationalProtection of Human Rights, says:
Framers of the United Nations Charter gave human rights a new international status and all signatories pledged themselves to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. However, the record of these last
thirty-two years gives cause for grave concern. A rapidly changing international community continues to witness atrocities and mass murders, as well as
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the denigration of the dignity and worth of individuals and groups. . . . The
practice of torture is widespread, the incidence of terror has never been
greater . . • [G]ross violations of human rights around the world virtually rival
the totalitarian excesses of the interwar years and patently demonstrate that
the peoples of the United Nations have not yet made good on their promise
to promote basic human rights.'
In awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International, the Nobel
Committee said:
[S]ince the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the
United Nations almost [thirty] years ago, positive forces have fought in many
countries to evoke its ideals. But the world had during those years witnessed
an increasing brutalization, an internationalization of violence, terrorism and
torture....
There is a similarity between the problems of armaments and human
rights not only in the results hitherto achieved in efforts to solve them, but
also (a) in that neither can be solved unless the central problems of international relations are solved, and (b) in that the solution of these central problems must mean the solution of these two, among others.
An important difference between the two problems is that efforts to solve
the armaments problem, per se, are not directed to the central problems
whereas efforts to solve the human rights problem are. Trying to solve the armaments problem per se is like trying to cure a disease by treating the symptoms. The human rights problem, on the other hand, is not only a symptom
of the disease but an integral part of it. The central problem is that humanity
is divided into separate communities. Differing views of human rights result
from this division.
A second difference between the armaments and human rights problems
includes the fact that the former is clearly and essentially an international
problem. No one would think of saying that it is essentially domestic. On the
other hand, human rights practices are domestic in the important sense that
they are frequently so regarded by the authorities and supporting populations
responsible for them in particular countries. Regimes sometimes feel that
their very survival is threatened by attacks on their human rights practices.
Thus, when the United States was seen as demanding that South Africa institute democracy in the form of equal votes for all, the South African Prime
Minister said:
[W]hereas, as it appears to us at the moment, the Soviets want to kill us off by
force, the United States wants to strangle us with finesse.'

1.
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, NEW ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (25th Rep. 1977).

2. Hawk, For the Proection of Human Values, MATCHBOX, Fall 1977, at 1.
3. Interview with John Vorster, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, A.B.C. News.
Issues and Answers (Oct. 23, 1977).
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In some important cases, the United Nations has sought candidly to improve
human rights practices in particular countries by forcing the removal of regimes in those countries.4 When I suggest that some human rights issues are
essentially domestic I am not speaking in terms of technicalities (such as interpretations of the United Nations Charter), but in terms of how responsible
authorities and concerned individuals feel sometimes about particular issues.
In summary, our efforts to solve the armaments problem per se, as a separate issue seem doomed because they are not aimed at the basic problem.
Our efforts to solve the human rights problem are aimed in the right direction, but they encounter difficulties because of the intractable nature of that
problem.
For our purposes we can identify two main categories of international activity. First is the political, largely concerned with the handling of disputes and
situations. The second area of activity is designed to improve conditions of life.
The United Nations Charter calls for activity in both categories. While political
activity is more important to our thesis, I will touch first upon the latter.
Compared with the League of Nations Covenant (which called almost exclusively for dispute-handling activity), the United Nations Charter incorporates provisions for large new areas of activity in the economic, social, and related fields-including human rights. Charter programs for the advancement
of human rights fall within this area. The organization is directed to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms."5 Member states are committed, "to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the organization for the achievement" of this purpose.6
Human rights are not singled out in the more specific program authorizations, which are applicable to the general economic, social and cultural area;
and which are stated in general terms. They include: the making of reports
and studies; recommendations to the General Assembly, to member states,
and to specialized agencies; and the preparation of treaties and the holding of
international conferences. 7
These were intended to be broad and general programs directed to the
generality of states. They were not intended as authorizations to put pressure
on particular states for particular human rights practices. This intent was
manifested, among other ways, in the modifications that were made in the domestic jurisdiction clause as it appeared in the League Covenant" and carried
into the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 9 The modifications instituted in San
4.

This reference to the Spanish and Rhodesian cases will be mentioned below.

5.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.

6.
7.

Id. art. 56.
Id. art. 62.

8.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15,

para. 8.
Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization (Rev.) (October 7, 1944) U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE CONF. SER. No. 60, Ch. VIII, § A, para. 7.
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Francisco insured that the new programs in the economic, social, human
rights, and related fields could not cause the organization to intervene in the
domestic affairs of states. The United States was instrumental in bringing
about these modifications in the language of the clause and in its location in
the Charter.10
The present United States administration says that "no member of the
United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own
business."'" When states subscribed to the Charter, I am sure that they did
not intend to open up their human rights practices to international scrutiny,
criticism, and perhaps stronger measures. This situation rmay have changed.
In any case, the matter falls into our discussion of political, or disputehandling activity. States do not invoke the domestic jurisdiction rule except to
contest an action or avoid an anticipated measure. If the rule comes into issue, it is not important as a technicality, but as the result of how governments
and people really feel about the matter in issue.
The Charter provisions authorizing human rights programs have given
rise to considerable activity of which I believe the most important instance was
the preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
This instrument does not purport to be more than a statement of aspiration,
and this fact has contributed to the Declaration's effect in consciousnessraising in many parts of the world. There have been other pronouncements of similar character, on various aspects of human rights, and these,
individually and collectively, have no doubt had beneficial consciousness-raising
effects. However, they have tended to be obscured by their multiplicity
and the Universal Declaration continues to stand out. From the outset, this
document was considered the first step in an international bill of rights, which
would be completed by a treaty of comparable scope. The treaty was to enumerate rights and to give them status as binding legal obligations. This projected treaty became the two Covenants: The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.12 These
are in force in a number of states.1 3 This number includes the Soviet Union,
some western democracies, and the United States President has asked for Senate advice and consent to their ratification. 4 It is difficult to perceive how
such treaties, purporting to commit parties of basically different systems (in
which the differences definitely apply to attitudes about human rights) to
10. Doc. 1019, I/1/42, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 507 (1945).
11. Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights: Prioritiesof U.S. Foreign Policy,
Address by President Carter to the U.N. General Assembly (March 17, 1977) reprinted in 76
DEP'T STATE BULL. 329, 332 (1977).
12. G.A. Res. 2200, 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
13. After 30 Years, an InternationalBill of Human Rights, 13 U.N. CHRON. 50 (April 1976).
14. Remarks on Signing International Covenants on Human Rights, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 1488 (Oct. 10, 1977); President Carter Signs Covenants on Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 586, 587 (1977).
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such a broad range of rights, can -represent a true meeting of the minds. In a
press conference of April 7, 1977, the retiring director of the United Nations
Human Rights Division was asked whether, in adherences to the Covenants,
hypocrisy was not the rule rather than the exception and whether, for example, there was more torture than before the Covenants were signed. The answer did not deny this suggestion, but expressed hope that the Covenants
5
would provide new possibilities for improving human rights practices.'
Personally, I doubt that this will be the case. I was part of the team that
worked on both the Universal Declaration and the proposed covenant in its
early phase in the United States. I dropped out in mid-1948 when work on
the Universal Declaration was completed, since the work would henceforth
concentrate on the Covenant, which I did not feel was an effective way of
advancing human rights. I still hold this opinion and believe I have acquired
a better comprehension of the true nature of the change that will be required
to this end, and the difficulty of bringing it about. Such treaties are, in the
first place, essentially irrelevant. 6 Secondly, a dispute over human rights may
be more exacerbating if a treaty is involved than otherwise, because then either party can accuse the other of violating the treaty. 7 Between communist
countries and western democracies, efforts to implement the treaties can give
rise to interpretation disputes. For this reason the main significance of the
treaties. may prove to be in the area of international activity concerned with
the handling of disputes rather than in the more placid one I have discussed
concerning improved conditions of life. A third disadvantage of such treaties
is that they convey the illusion of being a means of progress, and thus distract
attention and effort from channels that might prove more fruitful, or even
the search for such channels.
The Charter provisions on human rights represent the outcome of efforts
by a number of able and dedicated people to enable the new organization to
attack the problem directly and to carry out programs that would actually improve the observance of human rights throughout the world. These people
would have liked stronger provisions in the Charter than are actually there.
What we have represents the maximum upon which agreement could be
reached. The resulting provisions form part of the program designed to improve conditions of life, and it was anticipated that they would be non15.

Mr. Schreiber Discusses Achievements of United Nations in Field of Human Rights, 14 U.N.
May 1977, at 39, 40.
16. This statement is premised on he apparent unlikelihood that such comprehensive treaties
can solve problems which are essentially aspects of the central problem of international relations.
A parallel case from this perspective is the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (August 27, 1928), 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
17. This statement assumes that if parties to the covenants desire to accuse other parties of violations of human rights, they will not normally be restrained by the restricted provisions for
handling such complaints contained in these instruments. This assumption would seem justified
by the freedom with which the United Nations has been caused to exceed its Charter limitations
as to the handling of disputes. This matter will be discussed further below.
CHtON.,
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controversial. Organization proposals were to be aimed at the generality-not
to particular states. The handling of human rights by individual states within
their respective territories was considered, I believe, a matter of domestic jurisdiction and outside United Nations competence. However, in actuality,
many complaints against individual states have been brought into the United
Nations. This type of activity soon became a matter of controversy within the
United Nations. Consideration of this subject brings us into the political arena
of international activity.
The political area has greater potential for change compared with that
concerned with improving conditions of life, because political controversy
grips people's attention more than declarations of principle and programs for
the improvement of economic and social conditions.
In moving to this area, we will leave behind the consideration of programs
directed to the subject of human rights per se. The important potential of
dispute-handling activity is found in central problems of international relations, such as those of world community, democracy, and peace; these obviously include human rights. If we could pursue this latter subject effectively
by action directed to improve human rights per se, we would contribute to
these broader goals, too. The problem is to find a practical channel to promote this interlinked set of goals. It seems to me that United Nations disputehandling functions and procedures constitute a channel. It is, in fact, the only
one of which I am aware. Its goal may be best described as the building of
world community sentiments. It is calculated to do this essentially by democratic means. The process would build democracy and would, accordingly, be
conducive to the improvement of human rights observances as understood by
democratic societies.
My study of United Nations political activity has persuaded me of the validity of several conclusions. First, we have been in error since World War I in
trying to achieve world peace and security by evolving means of solving the
disputes that arise under the traditional format of international relations. Of
course, dispute-handling was not the only road envisaged to this goal. It was
hoped that activities in the human rights area and, more generally, in those of
economic and social conditions, in regard to the strengthening of international law and the control of armaments, would contribute to conditions of
peace. However, these programs were considered essentially peripheral, at
least by ultimate decision makers. The core of political relations, involving the
emergence and handling of disputes and situations, was expected to continue
unchanged except that the United Nations was expected to be able to handle
all disputes successfully, either by negotiations or, if necessary, by the application of sanctions. In this perspective, when most people thought about means
of achieving peace and security per se, they thought in terms of methods of
peacefully settling disputes. It is, however, impossible to devise methods of
solving all disputes that arise under the traditional format of relations. We
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have not tried every means of dispute-settlement, but we have tried a considerable variety and combinations of different methods. It seems justifiable to
conclude that, given the political world that exists, we will not do measurably
better in the future. The system we have (or lack thereof) will give rise to intractable disputes and the occasional war. Therefore, we should turn our attention to the system itself and seek means of lessening the intensity of
disputes so that they will be manageable. Stated affirmatively, this would
mean building world community to the requisite degree.
My second conclusion is that the kind of community needed is not among
governments or states, but must be among the peoples of the world or the informed elements of the world population. At least, there is no way to my
knowledge of bringing about the desired degree of community among governments apart from their populations. However, community bonds can extend beyond national boundaries and among different national populations.
When this fabric exists to the requisite degree, it exerts the necessary control
over governments to assure sufficiently consistent policies for the maintenance
of peace. It was, I am convinced, the existence of such community sentiments
among the Scandinavian countries and Finland that permitted the peaceful
solution, in this century, of such potentially severe disputes as the separation
of Sweden and Norway, the Aland Islands case and the Eastern Greenland
case. It may seem that the goal of such a degree of world community is so remote that it is worthless to think about. As I see it, however, we do not have
much choice but to think about it.
The third conclusion is that the United Nations Charter outlines procedures which, if followed within limitations agreed to by all concerned as applicable to themselves, could contribute significantly to this goal. This would require to an increasing extent, of course, that significant disputes be brought
into the organization if not promptly settled and handled there according to
these procedures.
The United Nations dispute-handling function basic to this end is that of
peaceful settlement, which has to do with the organization's role in finding
agreed solutions of substantive issues in dispute. Its potential in this respect
has been overlooked because states have not been interested in longer range
objectives, but only in the traditional approach of pursuing policy goals as immediately and often superficially perceived.
One consideration has been that, from the beginning, the peaceful settlement function has been overshadowed by collective measures, often called the
enforcement power of the organization. It might be useful at this point to describe the two functions from the perspective of this discussion.
Primary importance was attached to collective measures because it was supposed to correct the deficiency of the League of Nations which had brought
about its failure to prevent World War II, namely the inability to use force to
put down aggressions. The collective measures function that was, accordingly,
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put in the Charter authorizes the Security Council to use force or lesser tangible pressures (such as economic or diplomatic sanctions) to deal with aggressions, other breaches of peace, or threats to peace.
The potential of the United Nations for the goals we are considering here
lies in the use of powers given to it with the understanding that they are applicable to all, in real world situations. The collective measures function is not
in this category. It was intended to apply to wrongdoers. Governments and
peoples do not regard their own countries in this light.
Governments did, however, recognize that their countries might become
involved in disputes and they wished to enable the new organization to assist
in finding solutions. Simultaneously, they had no intention of giving up the
attribute of traditional sovereignty, by which states reserve the right for themselves to be the final judge of matters of concern to themselves. The result
was that both Council and Assembly were empowered to discuss disputes and
make recommendations for their solution. However, United Nations political
organs have appeared in numerous situations to do more than recommend
solutions of disputes on their merits. Such measures were not, however,
agreed to in the Charter. There was no authorization of legally binding decisions and consequently, none for the enforcement of such decisions. Similarly,
there is no authorization of demands or condemnations. The basic limitation
to discussion and recommendation was agreed to almost tacitly and without
debate at the same time as predominant attention was being given to the collective measures function.
The present proposal is that governments concerned about improving human rights as well as in achieving permanent world security should support
strenuously the United Nations handling of all significant disputes within the
limits of the Charter provisions. If this could be accomplished, or seen to be
accomplished to a significant extent, it would be the first time since the beginning of the modern state system that major powers would be seen to exercise
uniform restraints, in accordance with an agreed upon plan, in the conduct of
their international relations. The traditional approach has been characterized
by freedom of governments to apply any available pressures that they deem
appropriate in the pursuit of their policy objectives. Therefore it is essentially
anarchic. It is difficult to foresee change taking place unless some mediating
agency blunts the sharp edges of direct state-to-state relations in disputed situations. The United Nations has the general qualifications to meet this requirement. In particular, it has the peaceful settlement function incorporating restraints agreed to by all concerned with the conscious anticipation that it
would be applicable to themselves in disputes that might arise in the future.
The potential of this process lies in bringing important international
disputes into the United Nations and in improving the debating process involved in their consideration. These debates could be expected to become
more full and free as parties realize that no powers would be asserted beyond
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those they, themselves, had agreed to. Relations would relax and confusion
would lessen as people came to understand the nature of the powers being
exercised. Fuller and freer debates are more likely to concentrate on the true
issues rather than on propaganda issues; to consider rationally proposals offered as solutions; and to select the best of these. Thus, debates would come
to fulfill gradually their inherent consensus-building role. The process is
inherently democratic and could tend gradually to strengthen democracy
world-wide. By the same token, human rights practices, as understood by
democratic societies, would improve.
An elementary international system for handling disputes and situations
thus was outlined in the Charter. As one part of the system, majorities in
given disputes in the competent United Nations organ, would be bound to
limit the organization to discussion and recommendation on the merits of the
case. The party or parties on the other side would be bound to acquiesce in
this procedure but would not be bound, morally or legally, to comply with
any resulting recommendation. Introduction of the system could not be expected, for some time, to bring about solutions of all disputes. Parties on both
sides of the case, as well as the other members of the competent organ,
would be bound together in the debating process and this, over a series of
cases should have reprecussions in the broad reaches of the world's populations, with a gradual tendency to build world community sentiments.
The Charter framers drew a blueprint and built the essential parts of a
system that had, and still might have, the capability of moving the world in
the direction of peace and security, though not in the manner intended originally. For this potential to be realized, a vision is necessary, which, up to now,
has been lacking. Essential to this realization would be equal and reciprocal
application of the limitations on United Nations dispute-handling powers.
These, however, were put into the Charter by statesmen motivated wholly by
concern to protect their own countries from unwanted actions. They were not
thought of, then or later, as intended for the protection of others. When the
organization began to function, statesmen continued to pursue the traditional
approach and utilized the United Nations dispute-handling resources as new
means of pressure. If limitations on Charter powers would have hindered desired measures, they were overridden by one means or another.
One example was the Spanish human rights case, in the first year of
United Nations operations. A General Assembly resolution', said, in one paragraph, that the Franco regime of Spain should be replaced by one more concerned about human rights. In the next paragraph it recommended that
member states withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Spain. The impression conveyed was that the Assembly was initiating diplomatic sanctions to
force a change of the Spanish regime-something it had never been empow18.

G.A. Res. 39 (1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 63 (1946).
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ered to do and a course of action which no government would accept as legitimate if applied against itself.
In such cases it is usual for governments and their representatives to offer
technical justifications of the legality, under the Charter, of what is being
done. In this case one justification was that the United Nations was merely
recommending that states withdraw diplomatic representation from Spain and
was thus staying within its powers under the Charter. Nevertheless, it appeared to the world that diplomatic sanctions were being applied. The purpose of the action was, it seems clear, to mobilize world opinion in support of
such action and to persuade the Spanish government that this was being
done. If statesmen of governments supporting the action had been challenged
on the ground that public opinion was being confused, since no power had
been given to the organization for this purpose of forcing the replacement of
a government, the answer might well have been that this was unimportant,
that governments and not public opinion were the actors under international
law; that governments knew what was going on, and so there was no confusion in quarters where it would be important.
However, public opinion is important since here the consensus must be
formed-the necessary consistency of thought patterns-which is the necessary substructure of any system capable of maintaining peace and security as
well as assuring generally acceptable observances of human rights.
The Spanish case was the first in a series in which the United Nations has
given the impression of deciding the merits of disputes. These cases include
the early Palestine case and later aspects of it, including use of the Suez Canal
and Israeli actions in Jerusalem; an important aspect of the Korean case; the
Katanga case in the Congo; and numerous pronouncements and actions concerning human rights in southern Africa.
The latter include the sanctions in the Rhodesian case, which bear some
resemblance to the measures in the Spanish case in having the apparent purpose of forcing a change or regime in order to secure the human rights of
the inhabitants. In the Rhodesian case, of course, the tangible pressure was
not the result of a mere recommendation to states that they apply the measures. It took the form of mandatory collective measures based on a finding
that the situation was a threat to peace. 19 However, resolutions, proposed resolutions and accompanying debates had conveyed the impression that the
purpose of organizational activity in this case was the suppression of the secessionist regime. 2 0 This was even suggested in the Council resolution initiating
the collective measures. The result has been that the world has seen the sanc19. S.C. Res. 232, 4 U.N. SCOR 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966).
20. Some of the relevant resolutions and draft resolutions are described, and the debates summarized in, The Question of Southern Rhodesia (1965) U.N,Y.B. 117-34 (1967); The Situation in Southern Rhodesia (1966) U.N.Y.B. 94-117 (1968).
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tions as having the purpose of overthrowing the regime, 2' even though no
government would accept for itself the power of the organization to do this.
This is a difficult case and was so recognized at San Francisco. Special
pains were taken there to make clear in the record that the functions of
peaceful settlement and collective measures were not to be confused in these
circumstances.

22

It may seem that the case is not only difficult, but remote from our subject. It should be recalled, perhaps, that the proposal under discussion would
seek to build world community in a democratic way, and thus improve the observance of human rights, through enabling debates on international issues to
perform their rightful consensus-building role. This cannot occur unless parties to disputes feel that they are being subjected only to powers they have
agreed to as acceptable and unless, moreover, the nature of the powers being
exercised are generally understood by governments and peoples. It is incumbent in a case like the Rhodesian one that every effort be made to make clear
to all concerned that sanctions are being employed only to deal with a threat
to peace, and that United Nations pronouncements on the merits are recommendations only. The fact that such clarifications might have to be made in
highly political and emotional atmospheres is but one measure of the difficulties that can be expected if significant progress toward world security is to be
made by this method.
Moving away from such extreme goals as the overthrow of regimes by
United Nations measures, lesser instances of purported decisions by the organization on substantive issues are comnonplace, in human rights cases as in others.
A 1968 report of a special rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission
stated that in situations showing consistent patterns of gross violation,
If dialogue and negotiation fail to prove effective, the mobilization, on a
world-wide scale of international condemnation and as a final resort the application of international sanctions, both economic and, if necessary and expedi23
ent, military, should be undertaken ....
21. That the General Assembly shared this view is indicated by G.A. Res. 2262, 12 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 45, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). To similar effect see, Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1966-15 June 1967. 10

U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. IA) 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/6701/Add. 1 (1967).
22. The Committee which drafted Chapter VI of the Charter, on the Security Council's
peaceful settlement function, indicated in the record that recommended settlements would have
no binding force. Doc. 1027, 111/2/31 (1), 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 159, 162 (1945). The Committee
which drafted Chapter VII, on the collective measures function, indicated that if the Council
were to attempt peaceful settlement of disputes of the more serious category justifying collective
measures (i.e., aggressions, other breaches of peace and threats to peace) the procedures employed should be those defined in Chapter VI on peaceful settlement. Doc. 881, 111/3/46, 12
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 507 (1945). The subject was also clarified in, The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings on the Charter of the United Nations Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th

Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1945) (statement of Leo Pasvolsky).
23. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, U.N. ESCOR, U.N.
Doc. E/CN. 4/949/Add. 4, 494, 497 (1968).
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This indicates that some authority must be capable of deciding gross violations of human rights. Also, the assertion of a right to condemn implies a
right to decide. The Charter provides no such powers of decision by nonjudicial organs or of condemnation. The statement also indicates that sanctions can be employed to deal with violations of human rights whereas, under
the Charter, such measures can be employed only to deal with breaches of
peace and threats to peace. This report was later endorsed by the Commission
on Human Rights. 24 In the same year, the United States representative on the
Human Rights Commission said that, "the Commission should not condemn
any [g]overnment unless it had sufficient evidence."2 5 However, there is no
power of condemnation found in the Charter, evidence or no evidence. Governments subscribing to the Charter chose not to subject themselves to this
kind of action. To assert it, nevertheless, seems calculated to exacerbate relations and increase confusion as to what the true powers of the organization are.
Although I have yielded to the temptation to use human rights cases to
illustrate the argument, this being the subject of our symposium, I am not
suggesting that human rights cases be treated differently from others. The
thesis has to do with the relevant potential of United Nations disputehandling resources per se.
I will conclude by commenting on several questions of practicality which is,
of course, of the essence of the proposed course of action. It may appear impractical because it is different and some aspects are remote from customary
thought.
One question of practicality might be whether on the basis of the United
Nations record, it is not utterly impractical to conceive of using this organization with rationality and restraint. My answer would be that we do not know
what the organization would be capable of, given the right kind of leadership.
Past leadership has been, in large part, self-centered and frequently has
sought agreement to overriding and distorting Charter limitations and rules.
The right kind of leadership would bring all significant disputes before the
organization and assure that they are handled in accordance with Charter
powers agreed to be applicable to all.
A second question might be whether the advocated program would produce as high a proportion of successfully settled disputes as the traditional approach. The proposed system could not, in any case, produce a worse record
than that produced by past practices and might prove better since governments and peoples might be more amenable to procedures held within agreed
24.

Commission on Human Rights Res. 3,2 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) 146, U.N. Doc.

E/4475, E/CN. 4/972 (1968).
25. 2 U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights (24th sess.) 62-63, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/S.R.
969, 18 (1968).
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limits than to those seen as imposing powers ultra vires.
I am not suggesting that in a case like Katanga Province, for example,
where the United Nations appeared to have success in carrying out a Council
decision to suppress the secessionist regime, 26 that the Council should merely
have recommended what it wanted done. The world apparently accepted the
existence of a threat to peace in the Congo, as it was then (now Zaire), and all
that would have been required by a proper interpretation of the Charter
would have been to make a bona fide effort to show that the military force
was an exercise of the collective measures function designed to deal with the
threat.
The Spanish case was different in that there was no visible threat to peace
and there was a finding by a Security Council Committee that there was no
such threat.27 Accordingly, there was no justification for sanctions and the
United Nations action should have been limited to recommendation. The result could not have been worse than what actually happened, since the measures in the case failed and were withdrawn after a few years.2" The oppressive regime continued for another generation (until Franco's death) when it
was replaced by one more concerned about democracy and human rights.
Outside pressure failed in this case and the change, when it came, came
clearly from within. The same must be true of other, recent favorable changes
in the human rights practices of Portugal, Greece, and India, provided these
prove durable.
The Rhodesian case, noted above, falls between the Katanga and Spanish
cases in that a threat to peace, while it was almost invisible at the time sanctions were instituted, developed later. Of course, the case is still unsettled and
any attempted assessment would be premature. However, it seems highly
doubtful that the dispute was brought closer to peaceful solution by the
United Nations actions, which appear to have decided it on its merits, and to
have undertaken enforcement of the decision. To the contrary, they might
have fueled the civil war that developed.
The Rhodesian case suggests a broader level on which questions of practicality may arise, namely the strangeness of any approach designed to achieve
a new format of international relations. It is scarcely possible to anticipate
bringing about such a change without encountering some problems and difficulties along the way. Suggestions, for example, that United Nations action in
26. The decision is readily inferrable from S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR (Res. & Dec. 1961) 3,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/16/Rev. 1 (1961). The military operation involving United Nations troops which
immediately preceded and seemed to bring about the collapse of the Katanga regime is briefly
sketched in Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1962-15
June 1963, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (1), at 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/5501 (1963).
27. Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question, 4 U.N. SCOR, Special Supp. (Rev.
Ed.) 8 (1946).
28. G.A. Res. 386, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 20) 16, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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the initial stage of the Rhodesian case should have been limited to discussion
and recommendation would have encountered protests and demands that any
alleged rules to this effect be set aside in the interests of justice. There is no
history of efforts to apply such rules dispassionately based on agreed to
principles-principles which, in a better world, might be called basic legal or
constitutional principles.
Some apparent risks and sacrifices might be anticipated at this and a
higher level where the goal being sought-the building of a world consensus
that would rule out the possibility of intractable and unmanageable disputes
-would entail necessarily some modification in the basic ideologies of some
major powers. Some regimes might thus feel threatened and consequently endanger world security.
These questions of practicality should be compared with the dangers to
which the world is subjected by its present political environment and the
downward spiral of insecurity which seems to be part of it.
The present plan would seek to bring the world's differences into a
marketplace of ideas. No country that believes in its own system and ideology
would hesitate to accept such a challenge. Since nothing in this proposal goes
beyond the rules and procedures deliberately agreed to by states as applicable
to themselves, it seems that risks to individual states and dangers of international upheavals would be minimized. Although the successful development of
consensus would necessitate some changes, these would be woven gradually
into the social, cultural and political fabric of states through the debating
process and attendant factors, so they could be expected to be incremental
and virtually imperceptible.
The thesis presented by this article is, first, the proposition that human
rights observances cannot be improved significantly by international action directed at the human rights problem per se. This problem lies close to the
heart of the core problem of international relations and shares its intractability. The core problem can be defined for present purposes as the division of
the world's peoples into separate communities and the corollary absence of
such an overall community as would obviate the emergence of intractable disputes of such importance that might lead to war. Progress toward the building of the requisite degree of community would entail, also, progress toward
improved human rights observances. It is submitted that progress toward
these goals would be made if all significant disputes would be brought into
the United Nations for a long period of time, and handled there in accordance with relevant Charter provisions agreed to be applicable to all.

